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Introduction
During a May 2014 House Science, Space and Technology Committee hearing, Federal Aviation
Administration and Federal Communications Commission officials and technical and legal experts from
those organizations testified alongside U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, commander of 14th
Air Force, and Air Force Space Command’s and U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Force Component
Command for Space (JFCC Space). These witnesses’ testimonies highlighted the difficulty of operating in
unregulated, crowded critical orbits filled with dangerous debris and the ever present danger of collisions
potentially making those orbits unusable. Lt General Raymond also noted that JFCC Space “provides
emergency warning of impending orbital collisions to all of the world’s spacefaring governments and
companies, though it collaborates closely in space primarily with Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom."1 He also explained that JFCC Space maintains a catalogue of all known orbiting systems and
debris. As nations join the ranks of the space-faring, the number of trackable objects grows quickly and
makes Lt General Raymond’s task more complex. “All of the witnesses who testified at this committee
meeting stated that the United States must improve domestic space traffic management (STM), and move
quickly to foster international agreement on use of space.”2 Governments and organizations across the globe
have expressed this same concern for many years now. The European Union has produced “Rules of the
Road” for space operations intended to be agreements between space-faring nations to mitigate debris and
preserve the fragile environment above our atmosphere. Even the late President Emeritus of the ICAO
Council, Assad Kotaite, recommended a new annex to the Chicago Convention to extend ICAO
responsibilities for producing International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for suborbital
and orbital civil space flights. 3 His conclusion that the current SARPs should be expanded highlights the
criticality of including tropospheric transition of space-faring vehicles and commercial point-to-point
suborbital transportation as considerations when developing new SARPs. Although integration with
tropospheric traffic has been studied for decades, the current operational environment has begun to bring
previously disparate pieces of STM into a more focused concept. With current global economic dependence
on space capabilities and the ever-increasing international economic interdependence, all nations have an
interest in maintaining access to space-based capabilities. With strong U.S. leadership and support from
other nations, a reasonable pathway to an ICAO role in STM is attainable.
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What is STM?
Even after decades of substantive literature produced on the subject, any group discussion of STM
eventually reverts to a consideration of the concept’s definition. Space Traffic “Control” is not the same
s
as
STM and Space and Air
ir Traffic Management (SATM)
(SATM), a term coined by the Federal Aviation Administration
in May of 20014, described the overall concept but focuses primarily on integration of space-transportation
space
vehicles into the National Airspace System (NAS). A very few,
ew, if any, of other attempts to name and define
the overarching concept often include additional, critical aspects of space travel such as electro-magnetic
electro
interference (EMI) concerns and end--of-life considerations. In recent years the interested academic and
Executive Branch communities have come to recognize and refer to the central idea as “STM”. While there
is still debate on the specifics, the most widely accepted definition is from the 2006 International Academy
of Astronautics, Cosmic Study on Spa
Space Traffic Management:
…the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe access into outer
space, operations in outer space and return from outer space to Earth free of physical or
radio-frequency interference.5
While concise, this definition
ion covers an exceptionally broad array of ideas related to four distinct stages of
flight of aerospace vehicles (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Four Phases of Space Flight
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Each phase requires its own understanding of existing regulatory environments, fluid dynamics, Keplarian
physics, Space Situational Awareness, international policy subtleties, and legislative finesse. The complexity
and number of disparate organizations involved helps explain why a STM concept would be best served if it
evolved in a deliberate, phased approach along a similar path as current global air traffic management
systems. However, in order to make a final STM capability easier to realize, each step toward its
development should be taken with the end state of a globally-standardized capability in mind.

Why STM?
As technological advances make routine suborbital transportation realistic and space becomes more
contested, congested and competitive, losing access to space-based capabilities becomes a critical concern to
nations and individuals around the globe. Space capabilities play a role in everything from buying gas to
national defense. Disruption in access to space-reliant services potentially range from minor inconveniences
to catastrophic global economic collapse. Though it is not that easy for the average global citizen to see the
potential impact day-to-day, looking back at similar historical developments helps to clarify why the world
needs STM.
Today any pilots that land aircraft at airports owned by any of the 191 member nations/organizations that
subscribe to the ICAO SARPs understand the standard lighting, markings, navigation systems, phrases and
single language used to ensure safety of those flights. It is hard to imagine how much more difficult and
dangerous international travel would be today without those standards. The parallels between early
aviation’s need for standardized air traffic management and today’s need for STM are easily discernable. In
the early days of aviation collisions between aircraft were very infrequent. The “big sky” theory (low
probability of running into one of the few other aircraft in a large area) protected airborne travelers for
almost two decades. As commercial aviation became more common place the network of airports, airways
and air traffic control facilities grew to keep pace with the increased activity (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Growth of the National Airspace System6 7
A series of studies by the U.S. government
rnment led to the founding of the ICAO as a result of the Chicago
Convention of 19448. A tipping-point
point in the focus on air safety came after the 1956 mid-air
air collision
between United Airlines and Trans World Airlines (TWA) passenger airliners in uncontrolled airspace. This
incident resulted in 128 fatalities and the destruction of both aircraft. As tragic as this crash was, it
fortunately precipitated recognition of an increasing danger to the public and the potential impact to the U.S.
economy due to the rise in unregulated commercial air traffic. The result was the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, which created today’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and led to the most advanced and safest
airspace system in the world9.
Just as this tragedy
gedy resulted in increased awareness of air traffic problems, recent events have prompted
increased awareness of space traffic issues. The February 2009 collision between the commercial Iridium
and Russian Cosmos communications satellites was a similar wa
watershed event for space-faring
faring nations.
Although there was no loss of human life, this event highlighted the need for the U.S. Government to
consider how best to conduct safe and responsible operations in space and promote those practices
internationally. Similar to the 1956 mid
mid-air
air collision, the potentially catastrophic effects a large-scale
large
satellite collision may pose to the accessibility of the space domain, the resultant second
second-order
order effects on
world economies, information systems, and national secu
security
rity systems is now being fully recognized by senior
world leaders.
After decades of progress the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) is still improving even today with the
Federal Aviation Administration’s NEXTGEN Air Transportation System which is adapting the current
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system to new technology and increased demands of more, faster and higher capacity aircraft10. But safe
passage in the area above the NAS still rel
relies on the “big sky theory” for protection of critical systems and
sustainability of the space domain.
The U.S. government officially recognized the increased activity in space in tthe 2011 U.S. National
N
Security Space Strategy where it states that the “current and future strategic environment is driven by three
trends – space is becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive.”11 The most telling indicator
in this analysis is the growth of the satellite catalog which the U.S. government updates daily using Satellite
Surveillance Network (SSN) sensors around the world. Figure 3 depicts the growth of the approximate
number of unique catalog items being tacked from 1958 through 2010.

Figure 3: Satellite Catalog Growth12

What isn’t apparent in figure 3 is the exponential growth in the number of trackable objects when the highly
anticipated space fence becomes operational within the next five years. When this occurs, the number of
cataloged items will increase from the te
tens-of-thousands to the hundreds-of-thousands
thousands range and current
processing systems and manpower would be quickly overcome by the magnitude off data available to be
analyzed. Fortunately, increment
ncrement 2 of the JSpOC Mission System (JMS) is expected to be able to
t available
in 2016 and will be capable of ingesting and analyzing this volume of information,, however, conjunction
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summaries developed from these data will still need to be distributed appropriately outside of the Department
of Defense13.
In addition to the increase in debris and new entrants to the commercial space market place, many
m
companies and governmental organizations wo
world-wide are beginning to have a growing interest in very
small, single function satellites better known as cubesats. Cubesats aree small (approx.10cm x 10cm x 10cm),
relatively inexpensive satellites that have become more prevalent in recent years due to rapid increases in
technology that allow owner/operators to launch a satellite with a single, specific mission and a short
lifespan.
n. Although tracking these items is still possible, many don’t carry transponders of any type, so
identification of individual systems becomes complicated. In 2012, cubesats
ats represented almost 10% of the
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) catalog , but as launch and cluster deployment systems advance to keep pace
proposals are being made to deploy as many as 50 cubesats
ts from a single launch leading to 25% of the LEO
population being made up of cubesats by 201714.
The
he number of actors operating outside Earth’s atmosp
atmosphere has also increased from only a handful of
nations in the recent past to over 60 nations and government consortia today.15 Along with these new
entrants comes the increasing congestion in electromagnetic spectrums with ass many as 9,000 satellite
communications
ications transponders are expected to be in orbit by 2015.16

Figure 4: Congested, Competitive and Contested
7

New
ew technologies and commercial ventures continue to expand the frontier of space and make point-topoint
point suborbital travel a realistic possibility in the next decade. The Federal Aviation Administration has
been preparing for integration of suborbital flight transitions through the NAS since 2001 in their Concept of
Operationss for Commercial Space Transportation in the National Airspace System17 and more recently in
their report titled Point-to-Point
Point Commercial Transportation in the National Aviation System.18 While these
studies are useful in considering tropospheric deconflic
deconfliction of traffic, they both avoid considerations outside
of the Department
tment of Transportation’s purview
purview.. The number of entities which have some authority,
responsibility or capability in each area of space flight must be considered carefully before any planning
plan
begins toward development of policies or procedures. Figure 5 depicts a generic concept of those entities
that would be involved in consideration toward new policies and procedures required to develop a working
STM concept.

Involved in STM Concept Development
Figure 5:: Entities Invo
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The information presented in figure 5 could lead a reader to conclude the U.S. is has an existing, although
incoherent, STM capability today. The individual parts exist in disparate organizations scattered throughout
the Executive Branch as well as in treaties and policies that loosely work together to provide protection for
today’s volume of activity.
In addition to the immense technical hurdles involved in space operations, a U.S. owner/operator has to
understand the requirements of each responsible organization in figure 5 and implications of their actions in
relation to treaties to which the U.S. is a party. There is no single point of contact within the U.S.
government that consolidates this information or ensures compliance with all requirements prior to operation.
An owner/operator is responsible for obtaining approvals and ensuring compliance where necessary, and
developing their own methods of protecting their system in the unregulated aspects of operations where
necessary.
As a safety precaution, many commercial owner/operators have agreements with U.S. Strategic Command
that allow them to receive warnings of potential conjunctions. In 2011 the JSpOC voluntarily made 4,331
notifications to satellite owners/operators regarding potential conjunctions and based on these notifications
owner/operators of space systems made 85 collision avoidance maneuvers.19 The conjunction notifications
and resulting maneuver screenings have increased dramatically since the 2009 Iridium/Cosmos collision and
this level of non U.S. Government owner/operator interaction was not originally intended to be part of the
JSpOC mission. 10 US Code § 2274 has been added to allow the JSpOC to perform these functions but as
this aspect of the JSpOC activity grows, the demand for resources to execute their traditional Title 10
responsibilities competes directly with a non-mission requirement of maintaining safety and sustainability of
the domain for commercial and non-U.S. Government owner/operators. Although the JSpOC Space
Situational Awareness (SSA) services represent only a portion of the overall U.S. STM activity (see figure
6), the criticality of these services requires an entity whose sole focus is the operational safety and
sustainability of vital benefits derived from operations in the space domain.
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Figure 6: Current STM and Space Situational Awar
Awareness Sharing
ring Activity

Any single point-of-contact “store-front”
front” entity would require the ability to coordinate all the existing
responsibilities, authorities and capabilities, across all strata of the aerospace doma
domain,
in, into a concise
coordination point for current
ent and future owner/operators of aerospace systems that travel through and above
the tropospheric.

Implementation
Much thought and effort from all over the globe has gone into developing a coherent “way ahead” for STM.
In 2004 the U.S. Department of Defense, NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration designed and
published a Space Vehicle Operators Concept of Operations20 that detailed how a Space and Air Traffic
Management System (SATMS) could bring different agencies together for the purpose of dealing with the
contested, congested and competitive space domain we are seeing emerge today. Following the publication
of the U.S. National Space Policy in 2010
2010, Executive Branch organizations met to further examine the need,
and possible designs, for a U.S. STM capability. Although earnest efforts were made toward developing a
realistic operational concept, the complexity of implemen
implementation raised the threshold for taking deliberate
actions toward developing a U.S. STM capabi
capability. Today technology is pushing us closer to a saturated LEO
environment while at the same time Department of Defense fiscal realities and increased geo-political
geo
activity necessitate prioritizing Title 10 missions over voluntary conjunction summary message distribution
10

to non-defense-related owner/operators. The incoherent U.S. STM capability is finding new supporters who
champion a new, focused STM “store front” with full knowledge that international participation is soon to
follow.
Once a decision is made to pursue implementation, much of the previous work on the subject can be
updated and used as a basis for a design. However, in the near-term, resolution is needed regarding what
entity will represent the “store front” to the rapidly growing population of owner/operators. The two primary
options that have risen to the forefront of discussions have been a lead federal agency and a commercial
entity. While a lead federal agency has its benefits, the ability to evolve quickly to meet the needs of a
changing industry is seldom found in a governmental organization. The more favorable entity would be one
that can use the current technology to quickly adapt to needs of a persistently-changing domain.
A commercial entity with full support of the U.S. Government would be better able to exploit the emerging
JSpOC Mission System (JMS) capability to quickly and efficiently transition non-traditional Title 10
responsibilities from the Department of Defense while improving support to owner/operators to help ensure
stability and sustainability of the space domain. The ability to make tactical decisions and quickly fund and
implement updates to existing capabilities will be critical in staying current with the ever-changing needs of
the aerospace industry. The Federal Aviation Administration has already dealt with this issue with
supporting aviation when, in 2005, they chose Lockheed Martin to transition Flight Service Station
responsibilities out of the federal agency’s purview21. While Lockheed Martin serves as the interface
between pilots for planning, the Federal Aviation Administration continues to regulate, inspect and meet
their regulatory responsibilities while no longer being burdened by the bureaucracy required to maintain and
operate this capability. A similar construct would allow owner/operators of aerospace vehicles and satellite
systems to interact with a “store front” organization through the four phases of flight listed in figure 1.
Once a decision has been made to pursue an STM capability using a commercial entity as a “store front”, an
outline of a phased approach to implementation would resemble the outline in figure 7.
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Figure 7: Phased Implementation Overview

The first phase of implementation would consist of preparation for transitions of responsibilities. This
phase will require strong leadership in order to bring disparate Executive Branch organizations together and
focus them all on one goal with a single set of objectives. As planning begins and the end goals are agreedagreed
upon, legislative changes could become necessary to enable what have been inherently governmental
responsibilities
onsibilities to be adapted to fit a new construct. As these changes begin to take root, a “store front” can
begin to take shape with tools and data from existing organizations being used to establish the capabilities of
the resulting entity.
Once established, manned and functional, responsibilities for preventing airspace conflicts between
transitioning space traffic and existing aviation traffic would evolve fro
from
m existing procedures used for launch
and re-entry of systems like the Space Shu
Shuttle and the X-37 program. Currently these procedures are
established on a case-by-case basis with coordination between the JJSpOC and the Federal Aviation
Administration.. As the number of launches and suborbital point
point-to-point
point flights increase a more established
est
procedure will be required in order to minimize impact on both the aviation and space operators. Figure 8
highlights some of the potential legislative areas that could be impacted by these types of changes. Airspace
designations, right of way rules
les in the NAS
NAS, pilot-in-command responsibilities for see-and
and-avoid as well as
passenger carrier regulations all could
ld be impacted
impacted. In these areas the Federal Aviation Administration still
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has Title 14 regulatory enforcement capability for vehicles operat
operating in the NAS. End-of
of-life, de-orbit, and
launch support are areas in which Federal Aviation Administration has Title 51 enforcement capability. This
type of enforcement capability for U.S. systems might be expanded to include enforcement capability to
t
ensure compliance with an STM entity’s direction to maneuver to avoid collisions.

Figure 8: U.S. Legislative Implications of STM

The second phase of implementation would begin with the transition of traditionally Department of
Defense-provided services
ces such as conjunction assessment, collision avoidance, anomaly resolution and
Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) support. In many of these areas the owner/operator lacks the
responsibility or even the ability to comply with any direction provided by an enforcement organization.
Most maneuvers decrease the lifespan of an orbital vehicle, which leaves an owner/operator being forced to
decide between decreasing the time-on
on-orbit
orbit or avoiding the risk of a collision. The final decision has to be a
coordinated
ted effort between the owner
owners/operators
/operators of the two objects predicted to be involved in the
conjunction because no enforcement mechanism, and sometimes no compliance capability, exists.
exists With no
existing regulatory regime or accepted SARPs, even the notification of a potential conjunction is voluntary
based on JSpOC workload even if a current agreement is enforce between the owner/operator and U.S.
Strategic Command. New SARPs dealing with these and similar circumstances would likely precipitate
changes
ges or additions to Title 51 in order to operate a U.S.
U.S.-flagged space system. Moreover, the National
Transportation Safety Board could also be drawn into investigating incidents involving U.S.-flagged
U.S.
space13

capable systems thus producing a need to adapt existing Title 49 regulations in order to ensure the U.S. has a
designated agency to investigate space system incidents.
Phase 3 would include a collaboration between the JSpOC the new “store front”. In phase 2 conjunction
assessments are completed by the JSpOC and provided to the new organization for distribution. In phase 3
the new organization will begin to conduct conjunction predictions then produce and distribute conjunction
summary messages to owner/operators. Providing a non-governmental entity full access to the JSpOC
catalog is problematic for national security reasons. Enabling this new organization to develop methods of
conducting and distributing conjunction summary messages is a possibility, but will require a great deal of
additional effort once a new organization is established and is operating. Distribution of the conjunction
summary messages would also be improved through additional international agreements that could
eventually evolve further into established SARPs.
However, just as current SARPs grew from U.S. leadership in aviation, the SARPs for STM will grow out
of an effective U.S. example and confident U.S. leadership in implementing an overall concept intended to
ensure a stable, safe space environment for future operations. It has not been the U.S. that has taken the
leadership role to this point, however. The desire to preserve the space domain prompted the European
Union to evolve their Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs) into the International Code
of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.22 Although the U.S. has agreed with the principles outlined in the
European recommendation, their implementation methods potentially impeded U.S. national security
measures and the effort has progressed very little despite years of effort from the European Union. Other
countries and commercial entities have also made strides in developing a STM capability, but none have
been able to move into a deliberate planning stage.
Initially this impasse appears to suggest that developing a STM concept would prove very difficult.
However, in reality it exposes this path to be a departure from the historically successful route, discussed
earlier, by which aviation SARPs were developed. A successful implementation strategy would parallel the
course which resulted in current ICAO SARPs and participating country codification of those accepted
practices. This route also will require a U.S. leadership role given the preponderance of technical capability
which resides in the U.S. Department of Defense for tracking orbital objects as well as the demonstrated U.S.
capability in developing and issuing conjunction summary messages to commercial and foreign government
owner/operators. A stable, proven U.S.-based capability could easily serve as a basis, just as it has in the
past, for a successful implementation of international standards that will help preserve access to space-based
capabilities for people around the globe.
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Conclusion
For decades, academic discussions regarding the concept of STM have led to a more well-understood idea
of what near-term realistic technological advances and current orbital congestion require to ensure spacebased capabilities continue to be available. Those theoretical concepts have become much more important in
recent years as aerospace leaders and experts from around the world have begun to publically acknowledge
an impending need for an effective STM capability and the expansion of ICAO aviation SARPs which
address activities through and above traditional ICAO atmospheric strata. While the U.S. Government has
the preponderance of global STM-like technical capabilities, it is spread among disparate organizations and
agencies with no single customer interface that is primarily responsible for safe passage to, through and from
the space domain. Strong U.S. leadership is required to expand current U.S. capabilities into a rules,
verification and enforcement entity which can serve as a basis for ICAO involvement and a global STM
capability. A safe aerospace domain will help lower cost and foster growth of the involved industries, and
help ensure continued availability of space-based capabilities to the global populous. All of this must begin
with the decision to move away from a hypothetical discussion and take the first step toward leading the way
to a sustainable, effective STM capability.
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